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Abstract—Low Power Wide Area Networks (LPWAN) have
been used to support low cost and mobile bi-directional com-
munications for the Internet of Things (IoT), smart city and
a wide range of industrial applications. A primary security
concern of LPWAN technology is the attacks that block legitimate
communication between nodes resulting in scenarios like loss of
packets, delayed packet arrival, and skewed packet reaching the
reporting gateway. LoRa (Long Range) is a promising wireless
radio access technology that supports long-range communication
at low data rates and low power consumption. LoRa is considered
as one of the ideal candidates for building LPWANs. We use LoRa
as a reference technology to review the IoT security threats on
the air and the applicability of different countermeasures that
have been adopted so far. LoRa extends the transmission range
by controlling the spreading factor (SF) and in turn, the data-
rate. LoRa nodes that are close to the gateway use a small SF
than the nodes which are far away. But it also implies long in-
the-air transmission time, which makes the transmitted packets
vulnerable to different kinds of malicious attacks, especially in the
physical and the link layer. Therefore, it is not possible to enforce
a fixed set of rules for all LoRa nodes since they have different
levels of vulnerabilities. Our survey reveals that there is an urgent
need for secure and uninterrupted communication between an
end-device and the gateway, especially when the threat models are
unknown in advance. We explore the traditional countermeasures
and find that most of them are ineffective now, such as frequency
hopping and spread spectrum methods. In order to adapt to
new threats, the emerging countermeasures using game-theoretic
approaches and reinforcement machine learning methods can
effectively identify threats and dynamically choose the corre-
sponding actions to resist threats, thereby making secured and
reliable communications.
Index Terms—LoRa, LPWAN, Security and privacy, Internet
of Things, Cyber attacks, Game theory, Reinforcement learning
I. INTRODUCTION
According to the estimation of Boston Consulting
Group [1], $267 Billion will be spent on Internet of things
(IoT) technologies, products, and services by 2020. For ex-
ample, the IoT market size of smart cities is predicted to
grow to $147.51 Billion by 2020 [2], since IoT can solve
many critical issues currently faced by urban cites, like high
energy consumption [3], [4], environment pollution [5], [6]
and transportation congestion [7], [8]. An efficient networking
system is essential to achieve real-time monitoring and intelli-
gent control of physical objects for IoT applications. Security
and privacy of the data that are exchanged between the
network entities are an integral part of an efficient networking
system and are usually defined by confidentiality, integrity,
and availability (CIA) in the information security paradigm
[9], [10].
A. IoT networks and security
The majority of IoT enabled technologies are directed
towards building smart infrastructure projects [11]. The Array
of Things (AoT) [12] is an urban sensing network of pro-
grammable, modular nodes that are deployed around cities to
collect real-time data on the city’s environment, infrastructure,
and activity for research and public use. The Chicago Park Dis-
trict maintains sensors in the water at beaches along Chicago’s
Lake Michigan lakefront [13]. These sensors capture the
measurements at a periodic rate along the lakefront. Pervasive
Nation is Ireland’s Internet of Things testbed operated by
CONNECT, headquartered at Trinity College Dublin, the Uni-
versity of Dublin. This testbed is built on LPWAN technology
enabled by LoRa [14]. There are other railroads and port in-
frastructure projects that are leveraged by IoT where hundreds
of sensors are deployed [11]. The IoT network communication
channel is predominate wireless; thus, the on-air legitimate
control and data messages can be overheard and modified by
an attacker. Moreover, an attacker with malicious intent may
inject illegitimate messages into the network. In [15], authors
have identified security, privacy, and trust as the significant
challenges to build smart city projects. It has been pointed out
in the white-papers by WIND RIVERS [16] that IoT security
is more challenging than cybersecurity because of the large
attack surface presented by the millions of IoT devices. Most
of these devices are resource-constrained and therefore, limited
by computing power for encryption capabilities. They are also
expected to operate for years without being replaced, hence
prolonging their exposure to attack from newer attack vectors.
Recently, Low-Power Wide Area Networks (LPWANs)
have emerged as an attractive communication technology for
IoT [17]. They can support large-scale coverage with long
communication distance at low cost and long network lifetime.
In an LPWAN network, all sensor devices directly transmit
data to an LPWAN gateway and can work for years with
low energy consumption. An LPWAN gateway covers a large
area of many miles and thousands of sensor devices. The
collected data is transmitted and stored in a network server
to be processed by different applications.
At present, four LPWAN technologies are mainly available,
i.e., LoRa [18], SigFox [19], Narrowband Internet of Things
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(NB-IoT) [20] and Long Term Evolution for Machine type
communication (LTE-M) [21]. NB-IoT has been developed
and standardized by 3GPP. NB-IoT is designed to support very
low power consumption and low-cost devices in extreme cov-
erage conditions [22]. NB-IoT and LTE-M work on licensed
cellular frequency bands, which are implemented on existing
cellular infrastructures by mobile operators. LoRa and SigFox
work on the unlicensed 900 MHz band but adopt different
business models.
B. LoRaWAN and unique security threats
LoRaWAN is the standard for wireless communication pro-
tocols that allows IoT devices to communicate over large dis-
tances with minimal battery usage. LoRaWAN supports single-
hop network topology with the end devices connected to the
network servers via intermediate gateways. The communica-
tion between the LoRa enabled sensor nodes, and the gateways
go over the wireless channel utilizing the LoRa physical layer,
while the connection between the gateways and the central
server are handled over a backbone Internet Protocol(IP)-based
network [23]. The data rate of LoRa networks is determined
by the spreading factor (SF). Higher SF corresponds to lower
data rates and in turn, long-range communication. A very
low data rate (0.3-50 kbps depending on the frequency band)
enables LoRa to cover long-range communication (1-2 miles).
However, it also increases the on-air transmission time in
the order of 3 seconds (depending on the payload). This is
a unique feature of LoRa network when the security risks
of the nodes in the network are not the same even when
these nodes use single-hop for communication. Therefore, it
makes LoRa network susceptible to different kinds of Denial
of Service (DoS) attacks, including jamming, replay attacks,
and eavesdropping and in different variability depending on
the distance of the LoRa nodes from the gateway.
DoS attacks are launched to destroy the availability of one
or multiple nodes. For example, an adversary may physically
tamper an end device to disable its duty or make it transmit
interference signals, or it can sniff the packets in wireless chan-
nels and selectively jam a particular portion of end devices.
DoS attacks disrupt legitimate transmissions and increase the
energy consumption of end devices by more re-transmissions.
In a jamming attack, a high power transmitter can transmit
small packets either continuously or randomly and interfere
with legitimate packet transmissions, disrupting the regular
network operation [24]. Experiments done with vehicular
communication have shown that RF jamming can lead to
large communication-blind areas [25]. Not much can be done
to mitigate jammers with unlimited resources in terms of
transmission power and spectrum efficiency [26]. LoRa works
in the frequency band of 26 MHz in the USA (902 to 928
MHz). Such a narrow band is not immune to such kind
of wideband jamming attacks. It is, therefore, essential to
seek the support of law enforcement to capture the attacker
physically. However, a continuous or wide-frequency-band
jamming attack is easy to detect. Usually, an attacker would
not reveal its presence but only listens to the channel passively.
It selectively jam packets by reading the physical header and
go to sleep or in listening mode after jamming the packet [27].
This attack mode is hard to detect and deter. In LoRa, since the
on-air time of packets is high, the reaction time of the selective
jamming attacker to jam the packet after the header is read is
also high. Therefore, this kind of attack is a significant threat
to the security of the LoRa network. On the top, LoRa end-
devices use random time slots to transmit packets. Therefore
LoRa network cannot distinguish between packet losses due
to regular congestion and a jamming attack.
In replay attacks, a valid transmission is repeated by the
malicious attacker, generating false messages to the gateway
and denying legitimate messages to reach the network server
or rejects a valid network-join request [28]. To maintain the
integrity of valid network join requests, LoRa uses random
numbers (DevNonce) that are derived from the physical layer
signal strength values. However, an attacker can destroy the
randomness by injecting high power packets in the network.
Such an attack has been a critical security issue for nodes
using LoRaWAN v.1.0. Some existing works in [29]–[32] have
analyzed the replay attack scenarios in the context of the LoRa
network when a node attempts to join the network.
When the network server receives a join request message,
it checks if the DevNonce is used from the pool of last
DevNonce (ND) not used. If the number matches, the join
request is rejected. For a given number of join requests per
day per device, a higher value of ND means that an attacker
has to wait for a longer time to use a DevNonce. In paper [33]
the authors have experimentally shown using LoRa hardware
SX1272 [34] that random number generator (RGB) can be
comprised in the presence of a jammer which can make the
LoRa end-device to repeat DevNonce. In the SX1272 Radio
Frequency chip, the N-bit random number is obtained from
the LSB (least significant bit) of the register RegRssiWideband
(address 0x2c). It is assumed that the LSB continually changes
due to noise and radio channel behavior and therefore used a
source of random number generator. A high power jammer
can make the register value constant, and the DevNonce value
can no longer be random.
In LoRaWAN v.1.1 specification, DevNonce is a counter
starting at 0 when the device is initially powered up and
incremented with every Join-request [23]. The specification
further states that ”a DevNonce value shall never be reused for
a given join request value (JoinEUI). If the end-device can be
power-cycled, then DevNonce should be persistent (stored in
non-volatile memory). Resetting DevNonce without changing
the JoinEUI may cause the Network Server to discard the Join-
requests of the device”. Since a loss of power or reset could
happen at any time, LoRa end nodes that comply with Lo-
RaWAN v.1.1 standard version must have non-volatile memory
like electrically erasable programmable read-only memory
(EEPROM). For each end-device, the Network Server keeps
track of the last DevNonce value used by the end-device and
ignores Join-requests if DevNonce is not incremented. In this
way, a replay attack during a network join-request is prevented
in LoRaWAN v.1.1. However, there is no reference to know
the current extent of usage of the LoRa devices that comply
with LoRaWAN v.1.1 and their network deployment scenarios.
It remains a faulty key-management issue for LoRaWAN v.1.0
end nodes until the hardware is not replaced completely [35].
An eavesdropper can also launch a replay attack. An eaves-
dropper can overhear a wireless transmission and get access
to sensitive or private information. Eavesdroppers use passive
receivers that only listen to the channel and hardly transmit
any signal making them very difficult to detect. In order to
avoid a replay attack, a nonce (random number) is used in a
message to verify its freshness [36]. LoRa uses a frame counter
as a nonce to generate the encrypted message using the shared
key between the transmitter and the receiver. When the frame
counter resets but the key remains the same, an eavesdropper
can capture consecutive packets to derive the plaintext [28]. An
eavesdropper can further launch a replay attack or selectively
jam valid messages.
Attack models are hard to predict, and attackers are equally
difficult to detect. It should be a two-prong countermeasure
to detect any potential threat and progressively learn about
the threat model (e.g., how it is affecting the confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of the network). In this way, any
countermeasure becomes more confident and robust. Different
consistency checks of network parameters can be used to
detect an attack. The game-theoretic approach can be adopted
with two adversaries trying to maximize their utility functions
[37]. Reinforcement learning methods are useful when the
attack model is not known in advance.
C. Survey papers and our contributions
Recent survey papers have done security risk analysis of
LoRaWAN [38]–[43]. However, none of these papers have
addressed the security threats that are unique to LoRa net-
works. There is no clear strategy to identify and detect a threat,
and countermeasures when the threat models are unknown.
Overall, we did not see security solutions that cater specifically
to the LoRa network.
Our paper has done an exhaustive survey of existing so-
lutions that can be applied to LoRa networks. Our paper has
identified external jamming and faulty key management as two
primary sources of security threats to LoRaWAN. We have
covered all major security approaches to counter jamming,
replay, and eavesdropping in the context of the LoRa network.
Our analysis shows that game-theoretic and reinforcement
learning approaches can be used to counter these security
threats, primarily when the attack characteristics are not
known. These proposed approaches can take advantage of the
state-of-the-art classification algorithms to classify threats and
tune the transmission parameters that suits best to counter the
attacker. In the context of LoRa, it can use tunable SF to
control the data rate and therefore, on-air time to reduce its
vulnerability. Hence there is a vast scope of further research,
and our paper has proposed possible future research directions
to make the LoRa network more secure.
We have organized the remaining of this paper in the
following order. Section II has discussed the general Lo-
RaWAN technological and security features. We discuss the
vulnerability issues in a wireless network in general in section
III to get a broad understanding of threats. Sections IV discuss
the unique features of LoRa and the threats in detail. Finally,
we explore the solutions that apply to LoRa networks in
Section V.
II. LORAWAN AS LOW POWER WIDE AREA NETWORK
(LPWAN) STANDARD
According to rfc8376 [44], ’Low-Power Wide Area Net-
works are wireless technologies with characteristics such as
large coverage areas, low bandwidth, possibly very small
packet and application-layer data sizes, and long battery life
operation.’
A. LPWAN and security
Paper [45]–[47] have surveyed the different LPWAN tech-
nologies and their security features. The design goals for
successful deployment and operation of LPWAN technology
are long-range, ultra-low power operation, low cost, scalability,
and quality of service. The extended range for wide area
coverage is achieved by operating in sub GHz range for low
signal attenuation as compared to GHz bands. It also uses
spread spectrum (SS) techniques to be resilient to interference
and robust to jamming attacks. To achieve a long battery life,
LPWAN technologies use single-hop communication to avoid
high deployment cost of mesh networks and congestion due to
the network traffic pattern. They also control the sleep/wake-
up schedules (duty cycle) to minimize energy usage.
When it comes to accessing the common media (usually
wireless between the end nodes and the Gateway), carrier
sense multiple access with collision avoidance (CSMA/CA)
[48] is the most popular media access control protocol (MAC).
This channel access protocol has been successfully deployed
in WLANs and other short-range wireless networks. The
virtual carrier sensing using Request to Send/Clear to Send
(RTS/CTS) mechanism inflicts excessive signaling overhead
and is usually avoided in LPWAN technologies. However, the
use of random access methods can make LPWAN vulnerable
to deliberate jamming attacks that increase the packet collision
rate and decrease the overall network throughput. In terms of
network security, due to cost and energy limitations, LPWAN
usually avoids cellular type authentication, security, and pri-
vacy mechanisms. Most LPWAN technologies use symmetric
key cryptography to authenticate end devices with the network
and preserve the privacy of application data. However, over-
the-air (OTA) security features, including authentication, are
not well supported in LPWAN technologies and can expose
the end-nodes to threats over a prolonged duration, including
eavesdropping and replay attacks.
Like a cellular service provider, SigFox deploys its gateways
in some cities and users subscribe to its service [52]. On the
contrary, LoRa is open-standard. It has released open-source
hardware (except the chips) and software. Users can build their
autonomous LPWAN networks. However, the available open-
source hardware and software of LoRa networks only provide
Table I: Device classification in LoRaWAN [23], [49], [50]
LoRa Class A LoRa Class B LoRa Class C
Asynchronous and bidirectional Synchronous and bidirectional Synchronous and bidirectional
In sleep mode except when transmit-
ting
Open downlink receive slots at
scheduled times
In receive mode except when trans-
mitting
Initiates uplink communications Synchronized with periodic beacons Network server can initiate uplink
transmission at any time
No guaranteed latency Fixed downlink latency No latency
Lowest power operating mode Additional energy consumption due
to beacon signal transmissions
Significant power drainage in the or-
der of 50 mW
Figure 1: High level LoRa network architecture [51]
some essential functions, e.g., single-link transmissions and
ALOHA-based multiple access.
Sigfox application payload is not encrypted, while in Lo-
RaWAN, a unique 128-bit encryption key is shared between
the end-device and network server, and another unique 128-bit
key is shared end-to-end at the application level.
B. LoRaWAN and security
LoRaWAN supports three different classes (Class A, B, and
C) of LoRa devices to address the diverse application needs.
They are tabulated in Table I.
Class A operation is the most popular and preferred mode
because of the lowest energy consumption among all the three
classes. End devices choose random slots to transmit packets.
Most of the devices are battery powered and maximize energy
consumption by going to sleep mode after transmission.
A high-level schematic diagram of the LoRa network is
shown in Fig. 1. Each end device can connect to multiple
gateways that are, in turn, linked to the network server. The
network server can connect to multiple application servers.
As per LoRaWAN security documentation by LoRa Al-
liance [53] and The Things Network [54], [55], LoRaWAN
uses the symmetric-key Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
[56] for encrypting, decrypting and message signing. To ensure
confidentiality of a message from the end devices to the
application servers, LoRaWAN (since v1.0.2) encrypts the
payload in a message with the 128-bit application session key
(AppSKey). For integrity, all LoRaWAN messages are signed
with a Message Integrity Check (MIC). It is derived from a
hash of the message content and a 128-bit network session key
(NwkSKey). The AppSkey and NwkSKey are derived from a
root key (AppKey). The end-device and the network server
know this key. All keys are unique for each end-device. For
availability, LoRaWAN supports multiple gateways (combined
with packet de-duplication on the network server) [30].
Fig. 1 illustrates the usage of the two keys to maintaining the
confidentiality and integrity of the LoRa networks. The basic
idea is that communication should be secure on multiple levels.
A network server does not need to be able to read the actual
contents of the message if it is not relevant for the network
or infrastructure. Therefore, NwkSkey and AppSKey are used
during normal message exchange. Fig. 2 shows a simplified
diagram of the use of AppSKey and NwkSKey. The AppSKey
must be only known by the end-device and application server,
whereas, the NwkSKey, must be known by the end-device and
network server only. The frame counter, FCnt is maintained
and evaluated for MIC in both the end device and the network
server to avoid replay attacks.
LoRa end devices are also vulnerable to replay attacks
during activation or network join sessions. Each end device
must join the LoRaWAN network before it can become active
in the network. Each end device has a unique 128-bit app
key (AppKey), and that is used when the node sends a join-
request message. The join request message is not encrypted
but signed using the AppKey. There are two ways to join a Lo-
RaWAN, i.e., Over-the-air Activation (OTAA) and Activation-
by-personalization (ABP).
In the OTAA method, the join-request message contains the
AppEUI and DevEUI which are unique to the owner of the
device and globally, respectively. The message also contains a
DevNonce which should be a randomly generated two-byte
value, and the network server keeps track of this number
to avoid a replay attack. A 4 Byte MIC using the AES128
CMAC process is used to maintain the integrity of these three
values. At the network server end, the MIC is recalculated
and checked using the AppKey that is already known to the
server. After validation, the network server generates its nonce
value (AppNonce) and calculate the end-nodes app session key
(AppSKey), and the network session key (NwkSKey) that will
be used for further communication between the node and the
network servers. The node receives the join-accept message
after encrypted with the AppsKey from the server. The node
Figure 2: Encryption of payload and message signature [32]
uses the AppKey to decrypt the message and generate the
AppSKey and NwkSKey key using the AppNonce [57].
In ABP, the end nodes come with the DevAddr. Both the
session keys (NwkSKey and AppSKey) should be unique to
the node. The end node can directly start communication with
the network server without any need of join messages.
III. WIRELESS NETWORKS AND SECURITY
LPWAN is a network of IoT sensors that communicate over
wireless channels to the reporting gateway. These gateways
connect the nodes to network servers and eventually to the
different application servers [23]. Therefore, the common
security threats in the different layers of the wireless sensor
network apply to LPWAN [58]. The wireless nature of commu-
nication and resource restrictions make these sensor networks
susceptible to many attacks. A comprehensive list of attack
types and their implications on network performance can be
found in [24]. They are listed in Table II.
A. Eavesdropping
Eavesdropping can be considered as an attack against WSNs
when an adversary node overhears the transmissions among
the sensor nodes. An eavesdropping attack is a breach of
confidentiality. Such an attack is countered by encrypting
messages with cryptographic keys.
B. Jamming attack
As discussed earlier, a jamming attack causes severe dis-
ruption of on-going communication between end-devices and
the gateway. It is an example of a DoS attack. A jammer con-
tinuously emits radio signals, without following any medium
access control rules [59].
C. Collision
In a collision attack, an attacker node does not follow the
medium access control rules and cause collisions with the
neighbor node’s transmissions by sending a short packet [60].
This attack can cause a lot of disruptions to the network
operation, including increasing the collision rate and end-to-
end delay. Due to the inherent broadcast nature of wireless
networks, it is not trivial to identify the attacker.
D. Replay attack
In the replay attack, valid data transmission is repeated
or delayed with malicious intent. The message is correctly
encrypted, and the receiver may treat as a correct request and
take action as intended by the intruder. One method to avoid a
replay attack is that both sides agree to create a random session
key for a specific period before starting any communication.
Instead of session keys, time-stamps in all messages are also
used. In this case, the receiver accepts messages that have
not been sent too long ago. The other technique is to use
one-time passwords for each request [61]. The attacker might
either have eavesdropped a message between two sides or may
know the message format from his previous communication.
This message may contain the secret key for authentication.
E. Wormhole attack
In the wormhole attack, an attacker records packets (or bits)
in one location in the network, tunnels them to another location
and re-transmits them there into the network [62]. A wormhole
attack is possible even if a node has fulfilled all the authenticity
and confidentiality of the communication. Wireless ad-hoc
networks are most susceptible to wormhole attack as there is
no central controller that manages the communication between
the nodes. In this way, it can fake a route that is shorter than
the original one within the network. Wormhole attacks can
confuse the routing mechanism that relies on the knowledge
about distances between nodes. Although the wormhole attack
is typical of multi-hop networks, in combination with a replay
attack, two malicious devices can act as a sniffer and a jammer.
The sniffer notifies the jammer through a low latency network,
and the jammer stops the packet from reaching the intended
gateway.
F. Node tampering
In this kind of attack, an adversary can gain full physical
control over some wireless sensor nodes by direct access.
A node-tampering is a typical attack scenario when sensor
nodes are geographically spread and are usually unattended.
This type of attack is fundamentally different from gaining
control over a sensor node remotely by breaching or take
advantage of loopholes in the security shortcomings [63]. By
gaining access to these nodes, the attacker can analyze and
change the functioning of the node, learn secret key material
(e.g. cryptography), alter sensor readings, control the radio
function of the node (read, modify, delete, and create radio
messages) without accessing the program or the memory of
the sensor node. Although ’tamper-resistant’ nodes can secure
communication, it will incur tremendous cost on network
deployment [64].
G. Selective Jamming
In selective jamming, the scenario can be that two nodes
communicate over a wireless channel when a jamming node
eavesdrops the message and classify it by receiving only its
first few bytes. Now this jammer can corrupt the message by
interfering with its reception at the receiver. Selective jamming
Table II: Attack types in different layers and implication on network performance
Attack type Layer Attack features Implication on network performance
Eavesdropping Physical Overhear and intercept data
Gain access to sensitive/private in-
formation
Jamming Physical
Intentional radio transmission to disrupt
communication
Cut-off communication, causing
congestion, exhausting energy
Collision Data link Using busy channel to cause collision
Disrupt communication, increase interfer-
ence and collision
Replay attack Network Repeat a valid data transmission
Generate false messages, increase conges-
tion
Wormhole Network
Create low latency tunnel between two
malicious nodes Sending false or out-dated data
Node tampering Physical Physical access of the end-device
Alter sensitive information (e.g. crypto-
graphic keys, routing table)
Selective jamming Data Link
data packets are selectively targeted based
on policy or rules
Cut-off communication, causing conges-
tion, exhausting energy
Acknowledgement
spoofing Data link Create false information
Delay transmission, knock out new uplink
transmission
Man-in-the-middle Multi-layer
Sniff network to intercept communication
between nodes, for example, during key
exchange stage
Gain access to sensitive or private infor-
mation
Denial of service Multi-layer
A general attack type that can include
multiple attacks happening simultaneously Disrupt normal operation of the network
is also an example of a DoS when legitimate messages are
stopped from reaching the intended receiver [65].
H. Spoofing attack including acknowledgment spoofing
A spoofing attack is an example of DoS attacks where
the attacker can forge its identity to launch, inject false data
packets, advertise and disclose false services to other wireless
nodes including false routing and control information to dis-
rupt the wireless network operation [66]. In acknowledgment
(ACK) spoofing, an attacker can capture an ACK packet, delay
its transmission while selectively acknowledge an unrelated
message which may not have arrived at the network server.
I. Man-in-the-middle (MITM)
A Man-in-the-middle attack happens when an outside at-
tacker intercepts a communication between two network en-
tities. Eavesdropping is an example of a MITM attack. An
MIIM attack allows the attacker to intercept, send and receive
messages meant for someone else without the knowledge of
the legitimate nodes in the network.
J. Denial of service (DoS)
A denial-of-service (DoS) attack is any such situation when
a legitimate node is denied access to network resources or
systems. DoS attack can stop nodes from sending messages
to reporting gateways, reject network joint requests and drop
messages due to deliberate interference in the medium.
The other types of attack that are mentioned in the Table
II are selective forwarding [67], blackhole attack [68], [69]
sinkhole attack [70], Sybil attack [71], [72] and Hello flood
[73]. These attack types are exclusively applicable to multi-
hop WSNs and adhoc networks as they manipulate routing
information in multi-hop sensor network scenarios. However,
the existing LPWAN technologies (i.e., Sigfox and LoRa )
have star topology. The broad attack types that can affect
long-range, low power single-hop networks are eavesdropping,
jamming including selective jamming, collision, and wormhole
with replay attack and ACK spoofing.
IV. SECURITY THREATS UNIQUE TO LORA NETWORKS
This section elaborates on the unique security threats of
LoRa networks. There are several survey papers [24], [74]–
[76] that have discussed the security threats in the wireless
network. They have broadly divided the network into WLAN
(using WiFi technologies) [77], WSN (using Zigbee and Blue-
tooth) [78], [79] and Ad-hoc wireless networks [80]. Normally
these kinds of networks have a short-range (100 meters). WiFi
has a high data rate (100 Mbps) while WSN Zigbee has low
data rates (250 kbps). LoRa is meant to cover at least 1-2
miles and therefore has a very low data rate (50 kbps) but
long on-air time. It makes LoRa susceptible to different DoS
and MITM attacks.
A. Selective jamming due to long on-the-air transmission time
Unlike other wireless technologies, like WiFi and ZigBee,
LoRa employs an adaptive CSS (chirp spread spectrum) mod-
ulation scheme that can extend the communication range in a
non-interference environment. The data rate of LoRa networks
is determined by SF and is updated by using an adaptive data
rate (ADR) algorithm. Higher SF corresponds to lower data
rates and in turn, long-range communication. Depending on
Figure 3: Air time of packets as a function of SF and packet
size
the SF in use, the LoRaWAN data rate ranges from 0.3 kbps
to 50 kbps (depending on the bandwidth), resulting in an on-
the-air transmission time between 2.6 and 0.03 seconds, if
the payload size is around 100 bytes. High transmission time
creates opportunities for adversaries to perform an attack on
the LoRa networks.
Fig. 3 shows the air time of LoRa packets as a function of
SF and payload size. The on-air time are calculated based
on Eqns.(1), (2) and (3) provided in the LoRaWAN 1.1
Specification [81].
TonAir = Tpreamble + Tpayload (1)
where,
Tpayload = 8 +max(ceil((8PL− 4SF + 28 + 16− 20H)/
(4 ∗ (SF − 2DE)))(CR+ 4), 0)
(2)
and
Tpreamble = (8 + 4.25)Tsym (3)
Here,
• PL Is the number of payload bytes
• SF The spreading factor (between 7 and 12)
• H = 1 when no header is present, and H = 0 when no
header is present.
• DE = 1 when the low data rate optimization is enabled,
DE = 0 for disabled.
• CR is the coding rate from 1 to 4
• Tsym is the symbol duration that depends on SF and
bandwidth
Another unique characteristic of LoRa networks is that the
difference between the lowest and highest data rates is vast,
resulting in a significant difference between the on-the-air
transmission time. The nodes that are close to the gateways
can use a high data rate and a short on-the-air transmission
time; on the contrary, the nodes that are far away from the
gateways have to use a low data rate and a long on-the-air
transmission time. As a consequence, the end devices in the
same LoRa network may experience different levels of risk
from the attacks of adversaries.
An attacker can make use of the long on-air time to launch
a selective jamming attack [43] when the attacker can read
the physical message header (which is not encrypted) and
jammed based on the jamming policy. Selective jamming not
only reads through the preamble but also the message header.
Thus attackers can listen on the channels, target a particular
device or traffic class and then jam selected messages [65]. In
order to selectively jam LoRaWAN messages, an attacker has
to perform the following steps. It first detects a LoRaWAN
packet. It aborts receiving if the received content triggers
the jamming policy (usually first 5 bytes). If no, it imme-
diately jams the channel. Therefore, the jamming window is
smaller than the general triggered jamming. However, selective
jamming can prevent critical messages from reaching the
gateway, especially for those sensor devices that only transmit
when the sensor state change happens (event-driven sensors).
Selective jamming is implemented on a real test-bed with
cheap hardware [82].
1) Selective jamming with Wormhole attack: Classical
wormhole attack requires two malicious devices in a wireless
sensor network [83], [84]. One device records regular network
messages and tunnels them to the other device through a low-
latency network. Generally, this kind of attack is meant for
mesh networks where false routing information is created to
drain out the energy of the network. The classical worm-
hole attack is not suitable for LoRaWAN that uses the star
topology. However, there is no time-related information in the
LoRaWAN message header and only loose timing requirement
due to LoRa’s long transmission time. Therefore, messages
can be recorded, jammed, and then can be replayed later
to appear as a valid message as long as a message with a
higher sequence number is received at the gateway. In this
kind of selective jamming and wormhole attack, two devices
are involved and act as a sniffer and a jammer separately. The
sniffer receives the messages and decides whether to jam as
per normal jamming policy. If the decision to jam is made, it
signals to the jammer using a low latency network to jam
the message immediately. The sniffer constantly sniffs the
network. In order to carry out this kind of attack, the following
steps are followed by the sniffer and the jammer.
The sniffer first detects a LoRaWAN packet and starts
receiving and recording the packet. By receiving a packet, it
sends a signal through a low latency (better than LoRaWAN)
to the jammer. By receiving the signal from the sniffer, the
jammer turns to the active mode.
By replaying the recorded regular messages while jamming,
the attacker not only intercepts the state change alert messages
but also makes it look like nothing out of the ordinary has
happened. The window of opportunity in this kind of attack
is even lower than selective jamming as there are two devices
involved. Devices that are using high SF and therefore, long
on-air transmission time are more vulnerable to this kind of
attack.
Figure 4: Time available to jam for various packet sizes
for each SF
Small scale experiments with wormhole attacks have been
carried out in recent times as literature suggests [82]. The
most critical aspect of a successful attack is that the reaction
time of the jammer must be less than the on-air time of the
LoRaWAN packet reduced by the message header bytes. In
[82], the mean reaction time of jammer is experimentally
found to be 100 milliseconds. Fig. 4 shows the time available
to jam for various packet sizes for different SF when the mean
reaction time is 100 milliseconds. It can be observed that LoRa
devices that are on the edge of the network and using higher
SF are more vulnerable to such kinds of jamming attacks.
This section shows that the threats to all LoRa devices are not
the same as they are not equally vulnerable. End devices that
are using low data rate or high SF have longer on-air time
and prone to these kinds of jamming attacks. Jamming causes
packet drop, the transmission of lost packets and overall higher
energy consumption of sensor nodes. End devices adjust their
data rate based on the distance from the gateway. There is
no intelligence, neither in the gateway or in the end devices
which might sit on top of the adaptive data rate that can adjust
the transmission parameters to counter the attack.
The relatively long on-air-time transmission of the LoRa
packet can result in ACK spoofing. An attacker can prevent
receipt of ACK packets through selective jamming of the end-
device and would later replay previously recorded ACK to
disrupt uplink messages.
B. Collision attack due to ALOHA-type medium access control
Although collision attacks and their mitigation techniques
are not unique to LoRa networks, the challenge in LoRaWAN
is to distinguish packet losses due to network congestion
or deliberate injection of packets to create interference with
legitimate packets.
LoRaWAN standard specifies that LoRa devices use random
time slots (pure ALOHA) to access the channel. Interference
occurs when signals simultaneously collide in time, frequency,
and SF. It can severely affect the network throughput. The
restriction on the duty cycle of LoRa end devices also con-
tributes to the overall network throughput performance. In
the USA, each end device has to wait for 400 milliseconds
after each transmission. Large SFs increases the time on not
only air but also the off-period duration. The maximum data
rate in such a network is limited by the on-air transmission
time in each subchannel. In [85], authors have shown that the
throughput is limited by collision (pure ALOHA) when the
traffic load and network size is low. With the increase in traffic
load (total transmission rate) and network size, the throughout
stabilizes because the duty cycle limitation restricts the LoRa
end devices to increase the packet transmission rate. Different
traffic loads (0-350 packets per hour per node) and the number
of end devices of 250, 500, 1000, and 5000 were used. The
payload size was 10 bytes, and the number of channels used
is 3. The results demonstrate that the performance behavior of
LoRa networks is unique as compared to WiFi and Zigbee.
Existing work in [86], [87] suggests that dense network
deployment can adversely affect the network throughput. The
authors in these papers have also suggested that in an overlap-
ping LoRaWAN network scenario, the effect of the collision
on network performance needs further investigation.
On top of packet losses due to the collision, jamming attacks
can aggravate the situation further by injecting malicious
packets over a wide frequency band. Since LoRaWAN does
not have any mechanism to sense channel before transmitting,
it will be hard for LoRa networks to mitigate a jamming attack,
especially in dense deployment scenarios.
In [88], [89], the author has proposed to use LoRa’s channel
activity detection (CAD) process to sense channel and reduce
collisions. According to the application note from Samtech,
the proprietary designer of LoRa transceivers, the CAD model
is designed to detect a LoRa preamble on the radio channel
with the best possible power efficiency [90]. The LoRa radio
receiver captures the LoRa preamble symbol of data from
the channel. The LoRa radio current consumption during
that phase is approximately 10 mA. The CAD duration is a
function of the spreading factor (SF). The energy consumption
to implement the CAD process for channel sensing is energy
prohibitive and suitable for only Class B and C end-devices.
Also, the author has not considered the scenario when there are
packet losses. The author pointed out that the performance of
channel sensing (CS) using CAD started to decrease beyond
1 kilometer and fails to detect channel activity many times
during an ongoing transmission.
In [91], the authors have proposed the distributed queueing
(DQ) algorithm for channel access that will mainly cater to
the IoT network traffic and present itself as an alternative to
ALOHA. The motivation for the authors stemmed from the
wide variety of applications that use IoT networks for commu-
nication. Examples include structural health monitoring, asset
tracking, automatic meter reading, and power grid protection
and control. In these application scenarios, the end devices
usually remain in sleep mode to save energy and only wake
up to transmit bursts of data.
Figure 5: LoRaWAN uses AES to encrypt messages
C. Encryption Key management issues in LoRaWAN
LoRaWAN employs NwkKey (AES-128) and AppKey
(AES-128) to protect data from a man-in-the-middle attack.
LoRaWAN implements AES in counter mode. The operation
is shown by a block diagram in Fig.5. Instead of a random
number, LoRaWAN uses the frame counter as nonce along
with a monotonically increasing block counter to create the
cipher stream. This cipher stream goes as input to the AES
encryption algorithm block. The key and the cipher stream
are used to encrypt the plain text to create the ciphertext. If
the counter block values are repeated with the same key, then
the same keystream is used to encrypt consecutive packets,
and confidentiality guarantees are void [92]. In LoRaWAN,
when the packet or frame counter is reset, while the key is not
changed, the block cipher recreates the same key values. Some
previous studies [93]–[96] have shown that it is possible to
compromise this encryption method by capturing consecutive
packets from a device. If an eavesdropper captures two on-air
ciphertext streams using the same key-stream, it can get the
XOR-ed of two plaintexts by canceling out the key. It is then
straightforward to separate them [92].
We infer from this section that an attacker can affect the
integrity and availability of the LoRa network even without
deciphering the on-air packets. Using high power jammer,
it can cause interference of the channel, resulting in packet
losses. It can also endanger the integrity of packets by affecting
the randomness of specific numbers that are supposed to
guarantee message integrity.
V. CURRENT SOLUTIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF LORAWAN
Several techniques have been proposed to detect and counter
different attack scenarios, especially in the context of jamming
[97]. It is argued in that paper that anti-jamming measures
are not usually considered in wireless sensor network design,
but a formidable attack can seriously jeopardize high layer
security mechanisms. While there are pro-active measures to
mitigate signal interference due to jamming, detection of an
attack should be the first step as attack models may not be
known in advance.
In this section, we discuss the state-of-the-art security coun-
termeasures in wireless sensor networks and their suitability
for LoRa networks.
A. Detection and mitigation against jamming attack
Detecting jamming attacks is crucial because it is the first
step towards building a secure and dependable IoT network.
As mentioned in section IV, the LoRa network can suffer
from packet losses due to collision due to the random medium
access policy. A packet can also be lost due to poor radio link
quality. An attacker can also inject short packets in the network
to increase the collision rate. Therefore, it is hard to detect
packet losses due to the nature of the wireless channel access
mechanism from an actual jamming attack. In [98], authors
have proposed the idea of consistency check to detect an attack
from regular network congestion. They propose two enhanced
algorithms using signal strength for consistency check and
location information for consistency check separately. In the
first method, the packet delivery ratio (PDR) is combined with
the measured signal strength to build four different scenarios.
Results show that this method has improved jamming detection
accuracy. In the location information method, a node finds
its jamming status by checking its PDR with the one that is
consistent with its location. However, if the node is mobile,
it has to advertise the location to get the consistency checked
periodically.
Another well-known detection technique is proposed in [99]
but is primarily designed for TDMA protocols. It involves the
exchange of packets between a transmitter and a receiving
node to detect the amount of interference and subsequent
propagation of the interference information to the neighboring
nodes. This information is used to figure out the collision
scenarios in the network.
The JAM or jamming area service for sensor networks is a
reactive countermeasure to detect and map the jamming region
and then re-route incoming traffic through the unaffected
region [100].
1) Proposed solution and comments: A high power wide-
band continuous jamming attack can disrupt the service over
multiple frequency bands but are easy to detect. However,
a selective jammer that only disrupts communications for
specific packets is difficult to detect and deter. A combination
of proactive and reactive measures is required to counter this
kind of jamming attack.
The location-aware consistency check method can be used
by LoRaWAN to detect a jamming attack. However, this
method needs the support of the location service of the
wireless network. The traditional way to locate a device is to
install a GPS sensor within the device. LoRaWAN solutions
by design are low-power, and long battery life (up to 10
years). However, GPS sensors are power-hungry and can
reduce the battery life of a LoRaWAN sensor by a factor of
40-50. However, with LoRaWAN geolocation service [101],
it is possible to triangulate the position of the node using
timestamps when it is connected to 3 or more LoRa gateways.
LoRaWAN can combine the signal strength and the location
information consistency check method to detect a jamming
attack.
The detection method that is proposed in [99] can work for
adjacent nodes and will be vulnerable to any external jamming
attack. Further, this technique also uses network bandwidth
and energy that is in the premium. LoRaWAN protocol is not
well suited to handle high overheads, and LoRa end devices
only wake when there is information to transmit.
The JAM may work for a multi-hop scenario while LoRa
network only supports single-hop topology.
B. Game-Theoretic approach against jamming attack
The relationship between legitimate transmitters and jam-
mers is antagonistic, and they are capable of controlling their
actions intelligently. Therefore, game theory [102] is a natural
tool to model and analyze their behaviors in wireless networks.
In [103]–[105], the authors have proposed to countered the
jamming attack with game-theoretic approach. The Colonel
Blotto Game model is used to allocate resources (power)
among the nodes that are affected by the jamming attack so
that the network performance in terms of successful packet
transmissions and threshold bit error rate (BER) is maintained.
The nodes periodically report the interference level to the
gateway. The nodes in the mesh network are classified based
on their number of connectivity. Nodes with a high number of
connectivities are assigned more bits to report to the gateways,
therefore allocating more control bandwidth. In this jamming
mitigation technique, it is assumed that each IoT node has a
interference sensor that relays the measured interference level
to the gateway through a common control channel. The timing
channel is also used to maximize information throughput (in
bits/sec) in the presence of a jammer [106].
In [107], a bimatrix game framework is developed for
modeling the interaction process between the transmitter and
the jammer, and the sufficient and necessary conditions for
Nash equilibrium (NE) strategy of the game are obtained under
the linear constraints.
In [108], the authors have modeled the interaction between
transmitters and a jammer as a Power Control Stackelberg
game in co-operative anti-jamming communications. In a co-
operative wireless network, a relay node helps the source send
a message in the presence of a smart jammer. The relay node
improved the signal to interference plus noise ratio (SINR) and
led to a higher throughput. The legitimate transmitter and the
jammer can control transmission power independent of each
other.
It is pointed out in [109] that in the presence of high
power jammer, power allocation may not be enough to counter
jamming. The authors have considered a multichannel and
multi-user scenario. The utility of the users is defined as the
tradeoff between the system total throughput reward and single
users power consumption. Therefore, the jammer engages
with one user and worsen the communication, but the overall
throughput can improve as the jammer is busy with one user.
1) Proposed solution and comments: The control channels
(time and bandwidth) are used to maximize the information
exchange between nodes and the Gateways. In the context of
LoRaWAN, The packet transmission time TP that is assumed
in the solutions is in the order of µseconds. However, this
method is not effective in LoRa as the TP can go as low as
40 milliseconds. The utility function under the constraint of
energy never reaches 1.
In co-operative anti-jamming communication using Stackel-
berg game model, it is assumed that there is limitless power
in both the transmitter and the jammer. In a LoRa Network,
the SF can only be controlled, and there is finite power in the
end-devices. However, if LoRa end-nodes can control power
beside SF, the co-operative Stackelberg game model can be
used for interaction between jammers and the LoRa network.
In the context of LoRa network, power control may not be
feasible, but dummy users can be created to distract the jammer
while the regular communication between the real nodes and
the gateway continues.
C. Reinforcement learning-based anti-jamming techniques
Traditionally, spread spectrum techniques have been used
as anti-jamming methods in wireless communication. How-
ever universal reconfigurable radio peripherals can be used
by jammers to block most frequency channels and interrupt
legitimate communication. In [110], the authors have argued
that as IoT networks have been pervading every aspect of our
lives, security attacks are myriad and have become even more
challenging than ever before. Therefore, machine learning
(ML) and software-defined radios and networks can provide
reconfigurability and intelligence to the IoT devices and gate-
ways.
From the reconfigurability aspect, Cognitive radio (CR)
technology enabled by Software-defined Radio peripherals
provides an excellent platform to implement learning algo-
rithms to counter jamming. The learning algorithms can help
the CR to find the frequency space that has minimal signal-
to-interference ratio and improves the utility of the secondary
user (SU).
For a successful implementation of supervised machine
learning algorithms, it is essential to have a clear and con-
sistent understanding of inputs (i.e., data), the states of the
attack and the outputs. The state of the attack can be binary,
i.e., the good IoT network state or the bad IoT network state.
To build accurate classification models, the ML algorithm is
required to be trained with a considerable number of examples.
For all practical reasons, it may not be a feasible option to get
training data sets.
Reinforcement learning fills the gap between supervised
learning where the algorithm is trained on the correct answers
given on a data-set, and unsupervised learning that exploits
the similarity in the data-set to cluster it [111]. The main ad-
vantage of using reinforcement learning to detect and counter
malicious attacks is that no advance knowledge of the jamming
attack model is required. It does not rely on training data sets
but learns to find the right moves in order to optimize rewards
according to the current state.
1) Proposed solution and comments: The Deep Reinforce-
ment Learning (DRL) framework can be used to learn a model-
free neural network, which takes the LoRaWAN network
context as input and generates the best countermeasure to de-
fend against underlying attacks. DRL is a promising machine
learning approach, which instructs an agent to accomplish a
task by trial and error in the process of interacting with the
LoRaWAN network. The DRL inference results can tune the
setting of corresponding end devices, like transmission power,
on-air transmission time (determined by spreading factor)
and error-correcting code. Trust-able cryptography schemes
encrypts the results and transmitted to the end devices.
Four key elements of our DRL framework will be defined to
describe the learning process of DRL, i.e., state, action, policy
and reward. The state s defines the input of an agent, referring
to the representation of the LoRa network state, which can
be quantified by passively received transmission data from
every end device, like packet reception ratio and signal to
noise ratio. The policy pi takes the LoRa network state as
input to generate an action. It learns a mapping from every
possible state to action according to the past experience. In
our framework, the policy is implemented as a deep neural
network (DNN). The action a affects the LoRa network. Every
action gets feedback from the LoRa network. According to the
feedback, we calculate a reward r(s, a), which indicates how
good or bad does an action change the LoRa network given
a specific state s. Based on the reward, a value function Q(s,
a) is defined to update the policy of the agent. The Q value
reflects the long-term effect of an action, e.g., if an action
has a high Q value, the parameters of the DNN agent will be
updated to favor that action.
The DRL agent learns to defend against different DoS
attacks by training with a specific policy, supposing we can
produce enough transition samples (st, at, rt, st+1) on a
testbed. The agent first perceives a state s and generates an
action a by running the policy pi. Then, the agent obtains
a reward r calculated by the reaction of the LoRaWAN and
updates the policy based on the estimate of Q(s, a). In this
way, the agent and the LoRa network interact with each other
to modify the policy. After sufficient iterations, the agent learns
a stable policy. Besides, after each online inference, the agent
can also use the above training process to update the policy of
the DNN agent incrementally based on the new traffic data.
To incorporate DRL into practical DoS attack countermea-
sures, there are a set of challenges, including context-aware
DRL input representation, light-weight agent, efficient agent
training process and scalable DRL framework for new attacks
and dynamic network topology.
- First, to enable a more accurate and efficient defense, the
network context must have a fine-grained representation. The
statistical information, like packet reception rate, RSSI, and
the location of the sender, will be represented in a vector and
will be taken as an input to the agent.
- Second, the output of the agent is the transmission setting
of all end devices. For large-scale LoRaWAN networks, we
may have more than thousands of end devices. The output
size is large, and the action space is huge, resulting in long
inference time. One successful implementation of DRL is
Deep Q-Network (DQN) [112]. DQN algorithm combines Q-
learning with a DNN [113].
Q-Learning is a field of reinforcement learning paradigm
where the expected reward is calculated from the current state
and each possible action that can be taken separately in the
action space. Q-Learning can learn the optimal policy by trials
in the Markov Decision Process (MDP). It is pointed out
in [114] that the Q-learning algorithm can suffer from slow
convergence to the optimal policy if the state space and action
sets are large, resulting in degraded anti-jamming performance.
They have proposed DQN that was developed by Google
DeepMind [115]. It exploited the deep convolution neural
network (CNN) to reduce the dimensions of the Q-learner and
accelerate the learning process. In [116], authors have also
used MDP and reinforcement learning to mitigate jamming in
Cognitive radio. They replaced the OFF-policy characterizing
the standard Q-learning algorithm with an ON-policy so that
the cognitive radio takes the best action corresponding to the
maximum of the quality value, instead of trying random action.
This method will take care of any new jammer as and when
they emerge in the network.
LoRa network can leverage the use of different SF to create
the state (s) and action (a) space where it has SF from
7 to 12 to choose from [117]. The SF factor controls the
data throughput and therefore, the on-air time of a packet
for a given frequency band (125 kHz, 250 kHz, and 500
kHz) and packet size. The LoRa end devices will probably
be non-configurable due to constraints on stored power and
computational capabilities. However, the LoRa gateway can
be used as a reconfigurable platform that is enabled with
reinforcement learning capabilities. It can be used to make
decisions for the LoRa end-devices.
D. Power and rate adaptation approach
In [26], authors have proposed ARES (Anti-jamming Re-
inforcement System) for IEEE 802.11 compliant networks to
counter jamming attacks. They combine the rate adaptation
and power control to ensure communication in the presence of
radio interference caused by a jammer. The rate control mod-
ule chooses the data rate depending on the channel conditions
and the jammer characteristics. The power control module
adjusts the clear channel assessment (CCA) [118] threshold
of the IEEE 802.11 standard to facilitate the transmission and
the reception of valid packets during jamming.
1) Proposed solution and comments: Although LoRa has
no CCA mechanism to sense channel state, it can beacon
packets during network setup to determine the PDR without
any jamming interference and periodically compare the current
PDR to control the data rate (with SF) and power (if possible).
E. Spread Spectrum based methods against jamming attacks
As a pro-active countermeasure in the link-layer MAC
protocols, it is suggested to shorten the packet size, increase
the duty cycle, use time slots for packet transmission (TDMA),
or use different spread spectrum techniques (FHSS, DSSS
or UWB). The spread spectrum techniques use pre-shared
keys (either the hopping sequences or the spreading codes)
between the communication partners. Such a technique en-
ables nodes to spread signals in time and frequency or both
[119]. Several variants of frequency hopping (FH) have been
proposed in the literature to counter malicious attacks. Un-
coordinated frequency hopping does not provide a shared key
but is dependent on the maximum time for two nodes to
rendezvous on a frequency and the randomness (entropy) of
the frequency sequence. In [120], authors have used chaotic
frequency hopping for anti-jamming communication in a body
area network. Authors in [121] has proposed frequency hop-
ping based on jamming statistics. In paper [122], the authors
have introduced a random spread-spectrum based wireless
communication scheme that can achieve both fast and robust
data transmission. In the proposed scheme, Frequency Quorum
Rendezvous (FQR), it is guaranteed that two random hopping
sequences will rendezvous within a limited time.
The general direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS) uses
pre-known spreading codes based on a shared key to spreading
the message. However, an attacker can get hold of the key
and spread any random message and send it to the receiver,
thereby confusing it completely. To overcome this situation,
the authors in [123] have proposed the use of randomized posi-
tioning DSSS to avoid a jamming attack. Authors in [124] have
proposed DEEJAM, a MAC layer protocol to defend against
jamming using IEEE 802.15.4 compliant hardware. It uses
frame masking, frequency hopping, and packet fragmentation
to counter a jamming attack.
1) Proposed solution and comments: The performance of
randomized approaches is measured by the latency or delay
in the connection setup phase that depends on the probability
of encounters. Currently, no LoRa node uses this scheme to
communicate. Under intense jamming conditions, it may not
be a feasible solution as nodes may have to wait forever to
communicate.
F. Encryption key management against Replay attack
The authors in [125] have elaborated on the limitation of
using DevNonce to counter replay attacks that are discussed
in Section I. On the other hand, the limitation of the Lo-
RaWAN system to use the same AppKey for a lifetime can
be a serious problem as key leakage can cause node capture
and side-channel attacks [126]. Under the current LoRaWAN
key usage scheme, the network server generates both the
session keys (NwkSKey and AppSKey). If the network server
is compromised, it can use the AppSKey to intercept the
application layer data. In [126] the authors have proposed the
use of Dual Key-Based Over-the-Air Activation where they
have introduced NwkKey as a new network server access key.
It is separated from the original AppKey which will only be
used to access the application server.
1) Proposed solution and comment: In this proposed join
procedure, NwkSKey and AppSKey are generated from the
NwkKey and the AppKey, respectively. This kind of key man-
agement approaches can create two distinct fire-wall where
deciphering one key will be not enough to launch an attack.
G. Detection of wormhole attack using packet leashes
In [127], the authors have proposed a technique called
packet leashes to defend against wormhole attacks in wireless
networks. In this detection method, there is an upper bound on
the distance or time of travel of the packet. If that maximum
distance or time is exceeded, then a wormhole attack alarm is
raised. In [128], the proposed solution involves a small fraction
of network nodes to have location information (using GPS) to
precisely know the distance between the nodes to restrict the
packets maximum transmission distance. In [129], directional
antennas can also be used to mitigate the wormhole attack.
1) Proposed solution and comments: The approaches that
are discussed in [127]–[129] require accurate time synchro-
nization or timing measurement, or to transmit maximum
power in a particular direction. In the context of resource
constraint LoRa nodes, the applicability of the solutions is
ineffective. These methods are also not resource-efficient as
they involve using control bandwidth to communicate to detect
an attack. The nodes are also required to listen for interference
from malicious sources. However, selective jamming with
Wormhole attack only affects individual packets by using sniff
and jam method. The proposed methods will be rendered
ineffective in these scenarios.
H. Information theoretic approach against eavesdropper
In a traditional secure communication setup, a transmitter
wants to send a message securely to a legitimate receiver
without an eavesdropper reading the message. From the
information-theoretic model, such a communication channel is
modeled as a wire-tap channel model where we have a broad-
casting transmitter, a legitimate receiver, and an illegal receiver
[130]. Perfect secrecy is achieved if a transmitter can reliably
and confidentially send a message to the intended receiver
without exposing any bit of information to an eavesdropper.
The secrecy capacity has been studied in SIMO, MISO and
MIMO setups in fading channels in the recent past.
In [131], the authors have defined the secrecy capacity in
terms of outage probability and characterized the maximum
rate at which the sniffer or eavesdropper will not be able
to decode the message. In [132], [133], the authors have
considered multi-antenna scenarios in the transmitter, receiver,
and the sniffer.
The basic premise of the research outcome is that the
noise signal can be injected by the transmitter to degrade the
received signal quality of the potential eavesdroppers [134].
This method can also deter potential jamming attackers as it
will be difficult to sniff the transmitting channel to decode
the preambles before itself launching a jamming attack. The
authors have provided a solution for power minimization and
secrecy rate maximization, for a MIMO secrecy channel in the
presence of a multiple-antenna eavesdropper.
Table III: Summary of possible solutions to attacks in LoRaWAN
Attack type Affected layer Counter-
measure
Techniques Remark
Jamming attack Physical layer
Detection Consistency check with PDR,
signal strength and location in-
formation
LoRaWAN provides location ser-
vice using three or more LoRa
gateways
Re-active
measure
Game-Theoretic approach using
dummy nodes as a player while
the real nodes transmit packets
LoRaWAN can deploy extra nodes
to distract an attacker
Re-active
measure
Reinforcement learning to deter-
mine the best policy to counter
an attack and minimize jam-
ming affect
Use different SF from the SF pool
to control the data rate and link
quality
Collision attack MAC layer Pro-activemeasure
Different frequency hopping
(FH) and spread spectrum
(SS) techniques to increase
randomness and uncertainty for
an attacker
LoRaWAN can adopt hybrid FH
and SS methods to counter selec-
tive jamming attacks
Replay attack Multi-layer Pro-activemeasure
Dual-key based authentication
during network joining
Separate server access keys for
the network and the application
servers generated separately from
Network and Application keys
provided by the vendor
In transmit jamming, the assumption is that the legitimate
transmitter-receiver pair is aware of their channel state in-
formation (CSI) while the CSI of the attacker is not known
in advance as it is not realistic. The transmitter splits the
transmitting signal into two sections. Based on the CSI of
the receiver, the transmitter will beam the information-bearing
signal towards the receiver. The other section is the noise
signal that is orthogonal to the intended received signal. The
purpose is to degrade the quality of the signal received by the
sniffing attacker.
In receiver jamming method, the receiver confuses the
eavesdropper by transmitting the jamming signal. In this
method, the legitimate transmitter re-transmits the message
certain times, and the receiver randomly jams the message.
Such a scheme will make the sniffer unable to decode the
message.
1) Proposed solution and comments: The transmit jamming
technique requires careful distribution of transmit power be-
tween the receiver and sniffer as well as overall significant
energy consumption. LoRa does not support multi-antenna
propagation, and the use of transmitting jamming will end
up decreasing the SNR at the intended receiver.
The receiver jamming operation is bandwidth and energy
inefficient and will not suite LoRa devices that are constraint
by energy and bandwidth. Even LoRaWAN access protocol,
i.e., pure ALOHA, will not be able to support this kind of
jamming attack mitigation technique and end up losing too
many packets due to collisions.
I. Detecting passive eavesdropper with leakage RF signal
In paper [135], the authors designed and built a device called
Ghostbuster that can detect RF leakage of passive receivers
that are buried within the current transmission. Results show
that their device can detect eavesdroppers with more than 95%
accuracy up to 20 feet away.
1) Proposed solution and comments: Such a solution
against eavesdropping is suitable for short-range commu-
nication. But a LoRa network is deployed for long-range
communication, and an eavesdropper can be located anywhere
within a radius of 1-2 miles. However, the LoRa network can
set up dummy gateways to detect eavesdroppers.
J. Summary of possible solutions
Based on the discussions of the previous sections, we have
summarized the possible solutions in Table III. It will require
a cross-layer approach to detect and take action against the
different attack vectors.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTION
The LoRa network has gained prominence due to its long-
range and low power operation in the IoT application domain.
It has been used for data collection and processing from very
general to very critical application scenarios. Intentional radio
interference to disrupt legitimate communication is detrimental
to the full-blown use of the LoRa network. There exist
techniques to address the different DoS attacks. A DoS attack
can cause serious message integrity and confidentiality issues.
A DoS attack can jam specific packets, and even eavesdrop
to launch a replay attack. Conventional countermeasures are
not sufficient to deal with these attacks. Specific approaches
using game theory can be applied to the LoRa network to
thwart jammers that disrupt on-going communication. Since
an attack model may not always be available, online re-
inforcement learning algorithms can be exploited to tackle
jamming. Efficient learning is a trade-off between exploration
and exploitation. It is required to develop a deep reinforce-
ment learning framework to defend against DoS attacks. The
proposed solutions should meet the constraints of LoRa end
devices and should be evaluated by a comprehensive set of
performance metrics, including effectiveness, memory cost,
processing time, and power consumption. Overall, there are
significant research scopes to design practical LoRa networks
by integrating security solutions into networking system de-
velopment.
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